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INTRODUCTION

Out of the ashes of the Great Recession has risen a new, burgeoning area
of economic growth: the sharing economy. The idea is that any individual can
generate income by marketing to others their otherwise idle assets and skills.1
New companies are capitalizing on that idea by providing electronic platforms
that connect these parties. 2 Perhaps the biggest names in the sharing economy
are transportation network companies ("TNCs"), most notably Uber 3 and Lyft.4
TNCs are companies that "provide prearranged transportation services for
compensation using an online-enabled application or platform (such as smart
phone apps) to connect drivers using their personal vehicles with passengers." 5
Both Uber and Lyft have experienced a meteoric rise in both prominence and
valuation.6 Starting in California, these companies have expanded across the
country and into cities all around the globe.7
Such growth has not come without obstacles. One such obstacle is how
to classify the working relationship between TNCs and their drivers--courts
must decide if the drivers are employees or independent contractors.8 The
problem is that courts must apply the already murky standard found in worker
classification case law. 9 The standard-which has proved unsatisfactory even
when applied to more traditional working relationships-presents significant
See Christopher Koopman, What Is the Sharing Economy?, MERCATUS CTR. (Feb. 27,
2015), http://mercatus.org/publication/what-sharing-economy.
2

See id.

3

See, e.g., UBER, https://www.uber.com/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).

4

See, e.g., LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).

5
TransportationNetwork Companies, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, www.cpuc.ca.gov/tncinfo/
(last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
6
See Eric Newcomer, GM Invests $500 Million in Lyft, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Jan. 4, 2016,
8:30 AM), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-04/gm-invests-500-million-in-lyft-tobolster-alliance-against-uber; Sara Ashley O'Brien, Uber Gets $3.5 Billion from Saudi Arabia,
CNNTECH (June 1, 2016, 11:26 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/01/technology/uber-saudi-

arabia-investment/index.html (stating that Uber has a $62.5 billion valuation).
7
Available Lyft Cities, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/cities (last visited Mar. 22, 2017) (listing
all the cities where Lyft is available); Find a City, UBER, https://www.uber.com/cities (last visited
Mar. 22, 2017) (listing all the cities where Uber is available).
8
See, e.g., Heather Somerville, Uber Has Lost Again in the Fight Over How to Classify Its
Drivers, Bus. INSIDER (Sept. 10, 2015, 12:37 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uberindependent-contractors-or-employee-2015-9.
9
See NLRB v. Hearst Publ'n Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944), overruledin partby Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992); Keller v. Miri Microsystems LLC, 781 F.3d
799, 807 (6th Cir. 2015); FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (describing factors that
differentiate servant and independent contractor); N. PETER LAREAU, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
LAW § 261.06(1)-(2)(a) (2016) (describing the prohibition of "misclassification of employees as
independent contractors" and the vagueness of the term "employee").
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1
challenges when applied to new, 21st-century working relationships. "
Confronted with TNCs, courts will likely arrive at uncertain and conflicting
results. Consequently, public policy should dictate that worker classification law
unacceptably stifles innovation and wealth creation. Existing alternatives to the
employee-independent contractor dichotomy are found abroad, but these do not
adequately define the relationship between TNCs and their drivers. Therefore,
this Note argues that Congress and state legislatures should enact a new, third
worker classification called the platform contractor that suits the realities of the
working relationships created by the sharing economy and TNCs.
Part II.A defines the sharing economy and puts it into context with the
economy as a whole. Part II.A also describes TNCs and TNC drivers. Part JI.B
provides background on worker classification law and how it is applied in the
courts. Within that section are various worker classification tests and a group of
cases involving workers who could serve as useful comparisons to TNC drivers.
Part II.C discusses the current litigation on the worker classification of TNC
drivers. Then, Part III.A attempts to classify TNC drivers as a court would,
evaluating the relationship between TNCs and their drivers and drawing on
precedent discussed in Part II.B. Part III.A shows that courts already struggle
with classifying ambiguous working relationships and that the case of TNC
drivers will be no different, if not worse. Part III.B will argue that public policy
should dictate this result unacceptable and will look abroad for potential
solutions before arguing that lawmakers should enact a new, third worker
classification for sharing economy and TNC workers that is reflective of their
relationships and adequately protects the parties involved.

II. BACKGROUND

Before discussing worker classification of TNC drivers, this Note will
discuss the sharing economy in general and worker classification law as it stands
today.' 1 Part II.A will provide background on the sharing economy and TNCs to
aid in understanding this new area of development. Then, Part II.B will discuss
current worker classification law and how it is applied by courts. Lastly, Part II.C
will discuss current litigation involving the worker classification of TNC drivers.
A.

The SharingEconomy and TransportationNetwork Companies

The sharing economy is one name for a growing new market of startup
companies that use the Internet to connect individuals who wish to "share" their

10

See Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Employees, Employers, and Quasi-Employers:An Analysis of

Employees and Employers Who Operate in the BorderlandBetween an Employer-and-Employee

Relationship, 14 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 605, 609-10 (2012).
11 See infra Part II.A; infra Part II.B.
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underutilized assets. 12 The idea is that individuals can create wealth for
themselves by sharing their otherwise idle assets, such as a personal vehicle or
spare bedroom, with other individuals in exchange for a fee. 13 Although the
sharing economy experienced rapid growth in recent years, only 44% of
consumers in the United States are familiar with the sharing economy and only
19% of adults have actually been a consumer in the sharing economy. 14 Because
of this unfamiliarity, Part II.A will define and describe the sharing economy. Part
II.A. 1 will discuss the sharing economy as a whole and its place in and impact
on the United States economy. Part II.A.2 will focus on TNCs, such as Uber and
Lyft, and will explain what they are and how they work.
1. The Sharing Economy
The term "sharing economy" is one attempt to label an industry with "the
potential to increase global revenues from roughly $15 billion [in 2015] to
around $325 billion by 2025"; 15 other attempts at labeling this industry include
"the 'collaborative economy,' the 'peer-production economy,' or the 'peer-topeer economy.' ,16 There is no universally accepted definition of the sharing
economy, but it can adequately be described as follows: "any marketplace that
uses the Internet to connect distributed networks of individuals to share or
exchange otherwise underutilized assets."' 17 Whatever term is used, the growth
and size of the sharing economy means it should become a fixture in the
marketplace into the future.' 8
The sharing economy is a relatively new market, and one way to better
wrap one's head around its concept is to look at what some of its companies do.
Sharing economy companies operate in a variety of industries; consumers can
now turn to the sharing economy for many traditional products and services, like

12

Koopman, supra note 1.

13

Id.

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
THE
SHARING
ECONOMY
8
(2015),
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/industry/entertainment-media/publications/consumer-intelligenceseries/assets/pwc-cis-sharing-economy.pdf
is
Id.at 14.
14

16

CHRISTOPHER KOOPMAN ET AL., THE SHARING ECONOMY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

REGULATION: THE CASE FOR POLICY CHANGE 4 (Dec.

2014) [hereinafter
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Koopman-Sharing-Economy.pdf
17
Koopman, supra note 1.
18
See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 14, at 14.
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24
22
20
loans, 23 and labor. For example,
meals, 21 storage,
lodging, 19 car rides,

25
Airbnb operates in the same field as traditional hotels. Users of Airbnb's
website can list extra space in their apartment or home, and other users can book
a temporary stay.26 Since the company's inception in 2008, over 50 million users
27
have booked a stay through Airbnb. Another example is Lending Club, which
28
is a peer-to-peer lending network. Borrowers can apply for loans through
29
Lending Club, and any individual can make an offer to invest in the loan.
Nearly $24.6 billion in loans have been funded through the company as of
°
December 31, 2016." The common denominator in these companies is that
people are connecting directly to "share" their otherwise underutilized assets

31

with others-for a fee, of course.
Of consumers who are familiar with the sharing economy,
PricewaterhouseCoopers found that, compared to traditional industries, 86%
believe it is more affordable, 83% believe it is more32efficient and convenient,
for these
and 76% believe it is better for the environment. The demand
33
a shift
also
but
quality,
and
companies is not only based upon competitive price
34 A survey conducted by B&U
in mindset when it comes to ownership.
Consulting in 2011 found that 66% of consumers, and 77% of millennials, prefer

19

See AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).

See LYFT, supra note 4; UBER, supra note 3. Uber and Lyft connect riders with drivers who
provide transportation using their personal vehicle.
20

21

See MEAL SHARING, https://www.mealsharing.com/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2017). Meal

Sharing allows people to book a gourmet home-cooked meal at another person's house. Id.
22

See SHAREMYSTORAGE.COM, http://www.sharemystorage.com/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).

Sharemystorage allows people to list extra storage space for rent. Id.
See LENDING CLUB, https://www.lendingclub.com/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
23
See TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.corn/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2017). TaskRabbit
24
allows people to list their services for everyday tasks. Id.
See AIRBNB, supra note 19.
25
How Does Airbnb Work?, TECHBOOMERS, https://techboomers.com/t/how-does-airbnb26
work (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
Sarah Buhr, Airbnb Hosted Nearly 17 Million Guests This Summer, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 7,
27
2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/09/07/airbnb-hosted-nearly- 17-million-guests-this-summer/.
28

See LENDING CLUB, supra note 23.

CLUB,
LENDING
Online Credit Marketplace Work?,
Does an
How
2017).
22,
Mar.
visited
(last
https://www.lendingclub.com/public/how-peer-lending-works.action
What We Do, LENDING CLUB, https://www.lendingclub.com/public/about-us.action (last
30
visited Mar. 22, 2017).
31
See THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 16, at 4.

29

32

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 14, at 9.

33

See THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 16, at 14.

See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 14, at 14 ("The way we lived, the way we
34
consumed, this whole ownership economy much of it emerged out of driving our cars ... ").
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less possessions, likely as a result of emerging from the most recent recession.35
Additionally, 81% of people who are familiar with the sharing economy believe
consuming in the sharing economy is cheaper than the traditional form of
ownership.3 6
Despite its novelty, people have quickly accepted and praised sharing
economy companies. 37 Proponents claim that the sharing economy adds value to
consumers and eliminates inefficiencies in traditional transactions.38
Specifically, the sharing economy utilizes assets that would otherwise be "dead
capital., 39 Additionally, it increases competition by adding both supply and
demand, cutting transaction costs, reducing "the problem of asymmetrical
information between producers and consumers," and providing value to some
consumers who have been underserved by traditional businesses and industries.40
The sharing economy also has vocal critics. Some critics point to the fact
that many people are purchasing assets for the sole purpose of using them in the
sharing economy and that the word "sharing" really does not apply to what the
sharing economy has become.41 Other detractors in traditional industries claim
the lack of regulatory oversight on sharing economy companies leads to an unfair
competitive advantage and increases risk for consumers.4 2 Additionally,
advocates of workers' rights claim sharing economy companies are exploiting
their labor forces with low wages and unfair business practices.4 3 For example,
former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich argues that the sharing economy is
actually the "share-the-scraps" economy.4 4 He claims that workers in the sharing
economy perform menial tasks for minimal pay while the third-party
35

Id.

36

Id.at 9.

37 See THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 16, at 4; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
supra note
14, at 9 (citing statistics regarding the acceptance and benefit of these companies).
38
See THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 16, at 4.
39

Id. at 4.

40
Id.at 5. The authors explain how the sharing economy accomplishes these
ends,
respectively: adding more buyers and sellers; decreasing "the cost of finding willing
traders,
haggling over terms, and monitoring performance"; compiling consumer reviews
and presenting
them to other consumers; and evading existing regulatory measures. Id.
41
Christopher Mims, How Everyone Gets the "Sharing" Economy Wrong, WALL STREET
J.
(May 24, 2015, 3:32 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-everyone-gets-the-sharing-economywrong- 1432495921.
42

See Dean Baker, Don't Buy the "Sharing Economy" Hype: Airbnb
and Uber Are
Rip-offs,
GUARDIAN
(May
27,
2014,
7:30
AM),
4
2

Facilitating

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/201 /may/ 7/airbnb-uber-taxes-regulation
(discussing how Airbnb and Uber are free from taxes and regulations that face the
traditional hotel
and taxi industries, giving them an unfair competitive advantage and putting consumers
at risk).
43

Id.; see also Robert B. Reich, The Share-the-ScrapsEconomy, ROBERTREICH.ORG
(Feb. 2,

2015), http://robertreich.org/post/109894095095.
44 Reich, supra note 43.
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45
corporations that own the platforms receive the bulk of the fee. He also argues
that sharing economy companies are exploiting their status and nature to
"eliminate[] minimal [working] standards completely" and return workers' legal
protections to "the nineteenth century-when workers had no power'4 6and no legal
nothing."
rights, took all the risks, and worked all hours for almost
47
Central in the sharing economy debate is transportation. Companies
like Uber and Lyft have dominated headlines with multi-billion dollar
valuations 48 and complex legal battles that could severely affect each companies'
viability.49 This area of the sharing economy and the legal battles it has faced and
is currently facing will be described in Part II.A.2.

2. Transportation Network Companies
TNCs, like Uber and Lyft, were first defied in California as companies
that "provide prearranged transportation services for compensation using an
online-enabled application or platform (such as smart phone apps) to connect
5 ° In essence, TNCs
drivers using their personal vehicles with passengers.
1 Uber and Lyft are the two largest
perform the same function of taxi companies.
52
TNCs, with valuations of approximately $62.5 and $5.5 billion, respectively.
Additionally, Uber is available in over 521 cities across the globe, and Lyft is
53
available in 347 cities in the United States.
Perhaps the best way to understand the nature of TNCs is to walk through
54
of getting a ride through a TNC's platform. Passengers log on to
process
the

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

See, e.g., Anna Gallegos, The Four Biggest Legal ProblemsFacing Uber, Lyft and Other

Ridesharing Services, LXBN (June 4, 2014), http://www.lxbn.com/2014/06/04/top-legalproblems-facing-uber-lyft-ridesharing-services/ (describing the legal consequences that have made
Uber and similar companies the center of debate).
See O'Brien, supra note 6; Newcomer, supra note 6.
48
See, e.g., Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015); O'Connor v. Uber
49
Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
TransportationNetwork Companies, supranote 5.
50
Mary Beth Quirk, How Do Uber and Lyfi Work and Why Should I Even Care?,
51
CONSUMERIST (Sept. 18, 2014, 4:22 PM), http://consumerist.com/2014/09/18/how-do-uber-andlyft-work-and-why-should-i-even-care/.
Newcomer, supra note 6; O'Brien, supra note 6.
52
Available Lyfi Cities, supranote 7 (listing all the cities where Lyft is available); Find a City,
7 (listing all the cities where Uber is available).
note
supra
54
See Quirk, supra note 51.
53
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Uber's phone platform then enter their current location and desired destination."
Next, an Uber driver in the area claims the ride on the driver's own platform, and
a notification is sent to the passenger. 6 The notification includes the "driver's
name and license plate number" and "also display[s] the driver's route and
estimated time of arrival. 57 The driver picks up the passenger and follows GPS
directions to the destination. The passenger is automatically billed for the ride
through the platform, and both the passenger and the driver rate each other based
on their experience. 59 This rating system provides incentive to be a good
passenger and driver.6 °
It is also important to understand the role of TNC drivers and why so
many are willing to work for these companies. 61 According to Uber's own
survey, most drivers enjoy the independence of driving through the company's
platform: 87% of drivers replied that they drive for Uber in order "to be their
own boss and set their own schedule," 85% of drivers replied that they enjoy the
flexibility in their schedule and work-life balance driving for Uber provides, and
73% of drivers replied that they preferred "choos[ing] their own schedule and...
[being] their own boss" over a traditional work relationship.62 The survey also
found that drivers enjoyed working variable hours, with 50% driving "fewer than
[ten] hours a week" on average and 65% "chang[ing] the number of hours
worked per week by more than 25% from one week to the next. 63 Additionally,
many drivers do not rely on using Uber's platform as their primary source of
income: 61% "have full-time or part-time careers outside of Uber," and 33%
"us[e] Uber to make extra spending money., 64
The relationship between Uber and its drivers is governed by the
Technology Services Agreement ("Services Agreement").65 The Services

55
Id. The experiences for users of Lyft are nearly identical to those of Uber with the most
notable addition to the Lyft experience being a big purple mustache attached to the front of Lyft
drivers' vehicles. Id.
56

Id.

57

Id.

See id.
Id. (describing how payment goes directly to Uber rather than the driver and the driver
receives an online receipt).
58

59
60

Id.

See Kate, The Top 10 Facts You May Not Know About Uber Driver Partners, UBER
NEWSROOM (Aug. 5, 2015), http://newsroom.uber.com/2015/08/the-top-10-facts-you-may-notknow-about-uber-driver-partners/ (describing the benefits of driving for Uber).
62
Id.
63
Id.
61

64

Kate, supra note 61.

65

TECHNOLOGY SERVICES AGREEMENT BETWEEN UBER AND ITS DRIVERS, (Dec. 11, 2015),

https://s3.amazonaws.com/uber-regulatory-
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Agreement is the contract Uber's drivers must sign in order to use Uber's
platform.6 6 Of importance to worker classification, the Services Agreement
67
it
explicitly states that Uber's drivers are independent contractors. However,
68 The
drivers.
its
of
control
of
degree
a
Uber
grant
that
provisions
also contains
Services Agreement and other aspects of the relationship between TNCs and
their drivers will be discussed in more detail in Part III.
Although Uber and Lyft are young companies, both face major legal
69
battles that could alter the way they conduct business with their drivers. Related
Technologies, Inc.70
to the Services Agreement, cases such as O'Connorv. Uber
and Cotter v. Lyft, Inc. 71 are deciding on one major legal battle in the industry-72
whether TNC drivers are employees or independent contractors of the TNC.
However, proponents of TNCs view them as the future of transportation and fear
7
over-regulating such a booming and innovative industry. Thus, this issue
sparked a contentious debate that hinges on applying traditional legal principles
74
to newly-created working relationships. Part II.B will discuss these legal
principles.
B. Worker Classification
The concept of worker classification for purposes other than vicarious
75
liability is a product of industrialization. William Blackstone believed the
relationship between master and servant to be one of "three great relations in

2
documents/country/united states/RASIER%2OTechnology%2Services%20Agreement% ODec
meber/o20 10%202015.pdf [hereinafter SERVICES AGREEMENT].

66

Id.

67

Id. § 13.1.

See, e.g., id. § 2.3.
See Jennie Davis, Drive at Your Own Risk: Uber Violates Unfair Competition Laws by
69
Misleading UberX Drivers About Their Insurance Coverage, 56 B.C.L. REv. 1097, 1105-06
(2005) (listing some of the legal challenges Uber has faced, such as challenges to its practice of
surge pricing, classification of drivers as independent contractors, charging mandatory gratuities,
and whether it provides adequate insurance coverage); infra Part III.C.
82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
70
68

71
72

60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1133; Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1067.

73
See Richard A. Epstein, Don't Strangle Uber. Or Lyft. Or Airbnb, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 12,
36 2
135
2015, 11:22 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/dont-strangle-uber-or-lyft-or-airbnbsharing
the
to
frameworks
(discussing the futility and danger of applying current regulatory
economy for fear of impacting the viability of companies like Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb).
74

Id.

See Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can't Tell an Employee When It Sees One and
How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 304-07 (2001).
75
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private life."7 6 According to Blackstone, a master was liable for the actions of his

servant where that servant was acting under the control of the master. 77 Over
time, American lawmakers adopted this vicarious liability standard for
classifying workers in a variety of legal fields as employees or independent
contractors.78
Recently, TNC drivers brought suit against Uber and Lyft disputing their
classification by both companies as independent contractors. 79 The employeeindependent contractor issue is not uncommon: the most recent study by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics in 2005 found that there were approximately 10.3
million independent contractors in the United States, which constituted 7.4% of

the workforce8 0 Despite the prevalence of independent contractors in the

merican economy, courts struggle to apply current law in worker classification
cases. 81 The Supreme Court has noted that "[flew problems in the law have given
greater variety of application and conflict in results than the cases arising in the
borderland between what is clearly an employer-employee relationship and what

is clearly one of independent, entrepreneurial dealing.

82

This section will discuss the worker classification tests used by the courts
and provide examples of their application. Part II.B. 1 discusses tests courts use
to determine worker classification. It will also venture abroad to discuss tests
courts of other countries use in their determinations. Part II.B.2 will expand on
these tests by analyzing cases involving the worker classification of taxi cab and
FedEx drivers.

76

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

422 (1753). The other
two: husband and wife, and parent and child. Id.
77
See id. at 429-30.
78
Michael C. Harper, Defining the Economic Relationship Appropriate for Collective
Bargaining, 39 B.C. L. REV. 329, 334 (1998) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220
(AM. LAW INST. 1958)) ("The distinction was developed as a principle of tort law to determine
whether a firm has vicarious liability for the wrongs committed by those who may be advancing
the firm's interests."); Rubinstein, supra note 10, at 610 ("[T]he definition of 'employee' that
employer status is heavily dependent upon, developed from common law tort principles involving
vicarious liability of employers-not employment law dogma.").
79
O'Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Cotter v. Lyft Inc.,
60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
80

BUREAU

OF

LABOR

STATISTICS,

CONTINGENT

AND

ALTERNATIVE

EMPLOYMENT

2005
4
(July
27,
2015,
10:00
AM),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/conemp.pdf. Of these 10.3 million individuals, 82.3%
preferred their independent contractor arrangement over a traditional employment arrangement,
5.2% of respondents responded with "[it depends" concerning their employment arrangement
preference, and 3.4% were listed as "[n]ot available." Id. at Table 11.
81
See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944).
82
Id. This is certainly not aided by the fact that most statutory definitions of "employee" are
circular, such as "any individual employed by an employer." E.g., Employee Retirement Income
Security Program, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(B)(6) (2012); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(e)(1) (2012).
ARRANGEMENTS,

FEBRUARY
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1. Worker Classification Tests
Most modem employee classification decisions begin with some form
of the common law test of master-servant. 83 Today, federal courts follow an
iteration of the definition of a servant defined by the Restatement (Second) of
Agency when analyzing whether a worker is an employee or an independent
contractor. 84 Under this test, the United States Supreme Court in Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden85 focused primarily on an employer's "right to
control" the way a worker performs a job.86 The Court also considered a set of
secondary factors:
[T]he skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and
tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship
between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the
hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the
method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying
assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the
hiring party; whether the hiring party is a business; the provision
of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.87
The Court held that none of these factors were decisive by itself and considered
and weighed them all individually when making the determination of worker

§ 1.06.

83

LAREAU, supra note 9, at Ch. 261,

84

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. LAW INST. 1958). The Restatement lists ten

factors in making this distinction:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over
the details of the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a
distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with reference to
whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the
employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the skill required in the
particular occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the
instrumentalities, tools and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed; (g) the method of
payment, whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the work is a
part of the regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not the parties
believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and (j) whether the
principal is or is not in business.
Id.
503 U.S. 318 (1992).
85
86 Id. at 323-24.
Id. (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989)).
87
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classification. 88 From this holding and others, courts and agencies have
developed their own tests that fall in line with the factors outlined by the Court.89
One such test has emerged under the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA").9 ° Dubbed by scholars such as Professor Mitchell H. Rubinstein as
the "common law entrepreneurial control test," 91 this test views the common law
factors through the lens of the workers' ability to pursue entrepreneurial
opportunities.9 2 Articulated in FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB,93 the United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia evaluated the common law
factors through the "more accurate proxy" of a worker's "entrepreneurial
opportunity for gain or loss." 94 The court did not believe it created a new test; on
the contrary, it stated that the common law factors were still considered. 95 The
court merely believed the common law entrepreneurial control test to be less
unwieldy, particularly in cases where the line between employee and
independent contractor was blurred. 96

88 Id. (citing NLRB. v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)).
89
See, e.g., LAREAU supra note 9, at Ch. 261, § 1.06(b) (listing the 16 factors defined by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that fall in line with the Court's list of primary and
secondary factors in Darden).
90
See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Another common test
developed under the Fair Labor Standards Act focuses on the "economic reality" of the relationship
between employer and worker. For more information on this test, see Keller v. Miri Microsystems
LLC, 781 F.3d 799, 804 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722,
729 (1947)); LAREAU supra note 9, at Ch. 177, § 1.02(1); John C. Becker & Robert G. Haas, The
Status of Workers as Employees or Independent Contractors, 1 DRAKE J. AGRIC. LAW 51, 57
(1996). In addition, states developed their own tests and statutes for the purposes of state regulation.
While most of the state tests vary in language, they all are rooted in the common law right-tocontrol test. See Christopher Buscaglia, Craftinga Legislative Solution to the Economic Harm of
Employee Misclassification, 9 U.C. DAVis Bus. L.J. 111, 135 (2009) (listing the test used by each
state); see also Anna Deknatel & Lauren Hoff-Downing, ABC on the Books and in the Courts: An
Analysis of Recent Independent Contractorand MisclassificationStatutes, 18 U. PA. J.L. & Soc.
CHANGE 53, 64 (2015) (discussing recent changes to and enforcement of state statutory schemes);
Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Rethinking the Worker Classification Test: Employees,
Entrepreneurship,and Empowerment, 34 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 67, 85 (2013) (stating that a worker
who classifies as an independent contractor under a test at the federal level may very well classify
as an employee under a state test).
91
Rubinstein, supra note 10, at 619.
92
See FedEx, 563 F.3d at 497.
93
94

Id. at 492.
Id. at 497.

Id. ("[A]ll the considerations at common law remain in play."); see Rubinstein, supra note
10, at 619.
96
FedEx, 563 F.3d at 497.
95
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Other countries have expanded beyond the dichotomy of employeeindependent contractor. 97 For example, Canadian law evolved to form a third
worker classification between employee and independent contractor: the
dependent contractor. 98 The dependent contractor is intended to reflect the reality
that contractors vary in their dependence on the employer. 99 Canadian courts first
0 0 For this
determine whether the worker is an employee or a contractor.
determination, Canadian courts consider
whether the person who has been engaged to perform the
services is performing them as a person in business on his own
account. In making this determination, the level of control the
employer has over the worker's activities will always be a factor.
However, other factors to consider include whether the worker
provides his or her own equipment, whether the worker hires his
or her own helpers, the degree of financial risk taken by the
worker, the degree of responsibility for investment and
management held by the worker, and the worker's opportunity
for profit in the performance of his or her tasks.' 0 '
Only upon a finding of contractor status does the court then decide whether the
worker is a dependent or independent contractor. 0 2 The relevant portion of
Canada's statute defines a dependent contractor as
any other person who, whether or not employed under a contract
of employment, performs work or services for another person on
such terms and conditions that they are, in relation to that other
under an
person, in a position of economic dependence on, and
03
obligation to perform duties for, that other person.1

97

See Andrei Hagiu & Rob Biederman, Companies Need an Option Between Contractorand
Employee, HARV. Bus. REv. (Aug. 21, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/08/companies-need-an-option-

between-contractor-and-employee (discussing the inefficiencies of the employee-independent
contractor dichotomy and proposing a dependent contractor classification); see also Lauren Weber,
What if There

Were a New

Type of Woker? Dependent Contractor, WALL ST. J.,

http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-if-there-were-a-new-type-of-worker-dependent-contractor1422405831 (last updated Jan. 28, 2015).
98
McKee v. Reid's Heritage Homes Ltd., 2009 ONCA 916, para. 29-30 (Can. Ont.).
99
Id. at para. 35-36.
Id. at para. 34.
100
101

Id. at para. 38.

102

Id. at para. 34.
Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c L-2, s.3.

103
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Courts employ an exclusivity test to determine economic dependence, holding
that workers who show4 "near-complete exclusivity" satisfy the definition of a
10
dependent contractor.
2. Worker Classification in Case Law
Worker classification of drivers in general is not an issue of first
impression in the case law: for example, courts have considered the worker
classification of taxi cab and FedEx drivers.10 5 Such cases could be useful
analogs when predicting how a court will decide on future worker classification
of drivers' cases. 10 6 This section will first analyze cases involving taxi cab
10 8
drivers. 10 7 Then, it will focus on cases involving FedEx drivers.
i. Taxi Cab Drivers
In Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB, 10 9 the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia found that the taxi drivers at issue were independent
contractors, not employees.110 In this case, taxi cab drivers leased their vehicles
from Suburban Yellow Taxi Company.111 Suburban offered many different
leasing options, and drivers were furnished with a "fully equipped, licensed
cab."'1 12 Each cab bore Suburban's logo, and drivers had the right to use
1 13
Suburban's name to market their services.
1 14
The drivers kept all of their revenue from driving the leased taxi cab.
Suburban could not dictate drivers' performance or require drivers to pick up
passengers, but Suburban did make recommendations to drivers, such as
encouraging drivers to be courteous and prompt, describing how to handle
automobile accidents, reminding drivers not to congregate together, and telling

McKee, 2009 ONCA 916, at para. 30.
See Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014); FedEx
Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009); NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d
1090 (9th Cir. 2008); Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
106
See infra Section III.A.
107
See Yellow Taxi, 721 F.2d at 366; Friendly Cab, 512 F.3d at 1090.
108
See Alexander, 765 F.3d at 981; FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 492.
109
Yellow Taxi, 721 F.2d at 366.
110
Id. at 384.
104
105

ill Id. at 368-69 ("A wider selection of leases can scarcely be imagined.").
112
Id. at 369 (Cabs came with "a meter and radio dispatch equipment..., liability insurance,
tires, anti-freeze, free towing service.. . , and repair service for all damages determined not to be
the driver's fault and for all damages in excess of the driver's posted bond.").
113

Id.

114

Id.
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drivers to take the shortest possible route.l"5 Drivers had no hours requirement,
could use their leased cab for personal use, and picked up the majority of their
passengers though Suburban's radio dispatch." 6
Originally, the NLRB held that the drivers leasing taxi cabs from
Suburban were employees. 1 7 However, on petition by Suburban, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed. 18 The court found that "[a]t
practically all times ...[the] drivers are not controlled" by Suburban 1 9 and that
the drivers had an "entrepreneurial contribution" in their work. 20 Therefore, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that, under the NLRA, the
taxi cabs from Suburban were independent contractors, not
drivers who12 leased
1
employees.

On the other hand, in NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., 122 the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the NLRB's decision that the taxi cab drivers at issue were
employees. 123 Unlike the taxi company in Yellow Taxi, Friendly Cab Co.
("Friendly") could tell drivers where to work and what car to drive.' 2 4 Drivers
were subject to a policy manual and standard operating procedures that gave
Friendly certain degrees of control over its drivers.125 The policy manual imposed
a dress code and dictated how drivers should drive, 2 6 and the 2operating
7
procedures prohibited drivers from conducting independent business. 1
Given these facts, the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite result of Yellow
Taxi and found that the drivers in question were Friendly's employees. 128 The
court believed that the facts listed above restricted the drivers' "ability to ...

115
116

117
118
119
120

Id. at 371-72.
Id. at 369-70.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 384.
Id.
Id. at 380.

Id. at 384 ("At practically all times in the conduct of their operations, the physical activities
121
of Suburban's lessee drivers are not controlled by the lessor.").
122
512 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2008).
123
Id. at 1103.
124
Id.
Id. at 1093.
Id. at 1094 (instructing drivers to accelerate smoothly, "[a]void abrupt stops," "not stop next
to puddles or in front of obstacles such as signs, trees or hydrants," "stop either right next to curb
or our away from the curb[,]" and "maintain good personal hygiene and dress appropriately and
professionally").
Id. (requiring drivers to conduct all service calls over Friendly's communications system,
127
prohibiting drivers from distributing private business cards or phone numbers to customers "as
these constitute an interference in company business and a form of competition not permitted," and
mandating drivers to take all service calls from dispatchers).
128
Id. at 1097.
125

126
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develop entrepreneurial opportunities.' ' 129 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that
under the NLRA the drivers who leased taxi cabs from Friendly were employees,
130
not independent contractors.
ii. FedEx Drivers
In FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB,13 ' the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia held that FedEx drivers were independent
contractors under the NLRA.132 In this case, drivers signed an operating
agreement that outlined the relationship between FedEx and its drivers.1 33 Per
this agreement, FedEx could not dictate how much drivers worked, whether or
when drivers could take breaks, the routes drivers should follow, or any other
detail of performance. 134 Drivers used their own vehicles and were required to
remove FedEx insignia when not in use for FedEx.135 Additionally, drivers could
36
hire their own employees or assign their contractual rights to serve their routes. 1
The court acknowledged that some factors appeared to weigh in favor of
employee status. 137 FedEx required drivers to wear a uniform and display
FedEx's logo, imposed vehicle size and color specifications, and performed two
in-person performance audits per year, among other factors.' 38 Nonetheless, the
court held that the FedEx drivers were independent contractors. 139 It believed that
the record at hand showed the drivers had enough "entrepreneurial opportunity"
to "clearly outweigh[]" a finding of employee status. 140 Therefore, the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the FedEx drivers were
14
independent contractors, not employees. '
On the other hand, in Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package System,
Inc., 42 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the same type of FedEx

129

130

Id. at 1098.
Id. at 1103.

131

563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

132

Id. at 495.
See id. at 498.

133
135

Id.
Id.

136

Id. at 499.

134

See id. at 500-01 (detailing the specific factors in this case that appear to weigh in favor of
employee status).
138
See id.
139
Id. at 504 ("We have considered all the common law factors, and, on balance, are compelled
to conclude they favor independent contractor status.").
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014).
137
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drivers were employees. 143 In its decision, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected
the FedEx Home Delivery decision. 144 While FedEx Home Delivery was under
145
the NLRA, Alexander was under California state employment law.
opportunity
California's right-to-control test, like the NLRB's entrepreneurial
46
test, is an iteration of the common law right-to-control test.'
In contrast to FedEx Home Delivery, in Alexander the court held that
FedEx "unambiguously... exercise[s]" control over its drivers.1 47 The court
reasoned that FedEx effectively controls how much its drivers work and how and
when its drivers deliver packages. 148 The court also pointed to FedEx's
49
appearance requirements for drivers and vehicles in reaching its decision.
While the court found the secondary factors under California's test leaned in
favor of neither worker classification, the primary right-to-control factor
Circuit held that
weighed in favor of employee status. 150 Therefore, the Ninth
151
FedEx drivers were employees, not independent contractors.

144

Id. at 984.
Id. at 993.

145

Id.

143

See id. at 989 (quoting Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 471 P.2d 975, 977 (Cal.
1970)). California's right-to-control test contains nine secondary factors to be considered along
with an employer's right to control. See id. The first factor is the right to "terminate at will," which
weighs in favor of employee classification. Id. at 988 (quoting Tieberg,471 P.2d at 979). The eight
additional factors include:
(a) whether the one performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business; (b) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality,
the work is usually done under the direction of the principal or by a specialist
without supervision; (c) the skill required ion the particular occupation; (d)
whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and
the place of work for the person doing the work; (e) the length of time for
which the services are to be performed; (f) the method of payment, whether by
the time or by the job; (g) whether or not the work is a part of the regular
business of the principal; and (h) whether or not the parties believe they are
creating the relationship of employer-employee.
Id. at 989 (quoting Tieberg, 471 P.2d at 977).
147 Id. at 989.
148
See id. at 989-90 (finding that FedEx controlled drivers' hours by assigning certain
workloads and that FedEx assigned drivers to service areas and time windows to deliver packages).
Id. at 989.
149
146

150

Id. at 997.

151 Id. (holding that Fedex's "broad right to control ... its drivers' perform[ance] ... strongly
favors employee status").
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C. CurrentLitigation Involving the Worker Classificationof TNC Drivers
The two most prominent TNCs, Uber and Lyft, currently face litigation
concerning the worker classification of their drivers. 152 In O'Connor v. Uber
Techs.,' the Northern District of California denied Uber' s motion for summary
judgment that asserted Uber's drivers were independent contractors. 151 In this
case, a group of Uber drivers filed suit claiming that they were Uber
employees. 155 Uber filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that its drivers
should be judged independent contractors.1 56 Finding that the drivers are
presumptively employees
and that the facts remain in dispute, the court denied
1 57
Uber's motion.
The court stated that the facts cut both ways-some in favor of employee
and some in favor of independent contractor. 5 8 The court admitted that resolving
this issue "creates significant challenges" since the common law right-to-control
test was created for an economic model "very different from the new 'sharing
economy.' ' 159 It also hypothesized that the legislature may create law to govern
the sharing economy.1 60 Nevertheless, given the ambiguity in the case, the
1 61
Northern District of California denied Uber's motion for summary judgment.
In Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.,162 the Northern District of California denied Lyft's
and its drivers' motions for summary judgment on the question of worker
classification. 63 In this case, former Lyft drivers claimed they were Lyft
employees rather than independent contractors.164 The parties filed cross-

152
See generally O'Connor v. Uber Techs., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Cotter v.
Lyft, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015). As of the writing of this Note, the parties in each case
have attempted to settle. In both instances, the motions for approval were denied. See O'Connor v.
Uber Techs., 13-cv-03826-EMC, 2016 WL 3548370, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2016); Cotter v.
Lyft, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 930, 931 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
153 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (2015).
154
Id. at 1135.

156

Id.
Id.

157

Id.

158

See id. at 1153.

159

161

Id.
Id.
Id.

162

60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015).

163

Id. at 1070.

164

Id.

155

160
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motions for summary judgment.'6 5 The court denied both motions, finding that
directions."', 66
the evidence on worker classification "point in decidedly different
Like O'Connor,the court here could not decisively say whether the Lyft
67
drivers were employees or independent contractors. The court lamented that
resolving this issue is like being "handed a square peg and asked to choose
between two round holes" and that the common law right-to-control test
developed in the Twentieth Century "isn't very helpful in addressing this
[Twenty First] Century problem., 168 Also like in O'Connor,the court hinted at
169
legislative intervention in resolving this problem. But, absent a clear answer
to the issue, the Northern District of California denied both motions for summary
70

judgment. 1

III. ANALYSIS
When asked to classify workers with ambiguous working relationships,
courts produce unpredictable results."' Current law, focused on the right-tocontrol test or one of its proxies,'17 requires an intensive factual inquiry that can
73
prove difficult even against traditional working relationships.1 Now, consider
the instance of prominent sharing economy companies, such as TNCs, which
74 Already these
present a new business model and working relationship.
companies are challenging the existing law, causing some judges to lament its
take action. 75
application to TNCs in the first place and suggest lawmakers
Lawmakers could look abroad for support, like Canada's iteration of dependent
contractor, 7 6 but this would not likely provide clarity for courts nor would it
adequately reflect the reality of these new working relationships. Therefore,

165

Id.

166

Id.

167

Id. at 1078.

168

Id. at 1081.

169

Id. at 1082.

170

Id.

171

See Carlson, supra note 75, at 335.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. LAW INST. 1958); Rubinstein, supra
note 10, at 619.
See, e.g., Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981,988 (9th Cir. 2014);
173
FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 495-96 (D.C. Cir. 2009); NLRB v. Friendly Cab
Co., 512 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2008); Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 383 (D.C.
Cir. 1983).
O'Connor v. Uber Techs., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see Koopman, supra
174
note 1.
Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081; O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1153.
175
Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c L-2, s.3.
176
172
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Congress and state legislatures should enact a new, third worker classification
that suits the reality of the sharing economy and TNCs.
Part III.A below attempts to classify Uber's drivers-to fit the square
peg into a round hole' 7 7-by considering the Services Agreement and other
aspects of the relationship between Uber and its drivers in light of the cases
discussed in Part II.B. Ultimately, this analysis results only in further ambiguity.
Part III.B will then argue that public policy should dictate the employeeindependent contractor dichotomy unacceptable in the case of TNC drivers.
Lastly, Part III.C will discuss potential solutions, first looking at Canada's
dependent contractor law before arguing that Congress and state legislatures
should enact a new, third worker classification for the sharing economy and TNC
drivers.
A.

Worker Classificationof TNC Drivers:How Might a CourtResolve
This Issue?

Part II.C looked at two ongoing worker classification cases involving
TNCs. In those cases, the Northern District of California faced motions for
summary judgment arguing that the TNC drivers were either employees or
independent contractors.1 78 These decisions relied on the agreements and
relationship between the TNCs and their drivers and whether these granted the
TNCs control.17 9 This section will attempt to provide finality to that
determination in the case of Uber's drivers. First, Part III.A.1 will look at the
Services Agreement and the relationship between Uber and its drivers and will
draw conclusions as to whether these are indicative of employee or independent
contractor status. Then, Part III.A.2 will analyze these findings in light of the
cases discussed in Part II.B before concluding that none of this analysis yields
even a probable result.
1. Indications of Employee or Independent Contractor Status of Uber
Drivers
Certain provisions of the Services Agreement appear to lean toward
employee status for Uber drivers. First, some provisions of the Services
Agreement grant Uber degrees of control over its drivers. 180 Uber dictates who

Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081.
See Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081; O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1135.
179
Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1071 ("Lyft's relationship with its drivers is governed ...by its
Terms of Service .... "); O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1136 ("Once a prospective driver
successfully completes the application and interview stages, the driver must sign contracts with
Uber ...").
180 See SERVICES AGREEMENT, supra note 65, at Sections 2.3, 2.5, 4.3, 12.2.
177

178
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81
drivers are allowed to have in their vehicles while driving for the company.
The driver rating system ensures that Uber's drivers maintain a minimum level
82
of decorum with riders under penalty of having their Uber account deactivated.'
If drivers perform poorly on a given job, Uber has the right to adjust the driver's
fare.183 Both Uber and its drivers have the ability to terminate the Services
184
Agreement at-will with only seven days' notice.
Second, other provisions indicate employee status in ways other than a
right to control. 185 Uber acts as the payment collection agent for its drivers, which
186
employee status.
Uber acknowledges in the Services Agreement indicates
187
Uber does not generate any revenue without its drivers transporting riders. In
and its drivers has no set term; it is
addition, the relationship between Uber 188
termination.
indefinite in duration absent
Considering the realities outside the Services Agreement, other factors
point toward employee status for Uber drivers as well. Driving for Uber (or any

Id. at Section 2.3. Section 2.3 of the Services Agreement states that "unless specifically
consented to by a User, you may not transport or allow inside your Vehicle individuals other than
a User and any individuals authorized by such User .. " Additionally, this section states "all
Users should be transported directly to their specified destination, as directed by the applicable
User, without unauthorized interruption or unauthorized stops." Id.
Id. at Section 2.5. This section explains to drivers that Uber requires riders to rate their
182
driver. Then, it mandates that drivers "maintain an average rating by Users that exceeds the
If a driver's
minimum average acceptable rating established by [Uber] for your Territory ....
rating falls below the minimum within a specified time, "[Uber] reserves the right to deactivate
[the driver's] access to the Driver App and Uber Services." Id.
Id. at Section 4.3. Section 4.3 gives Uber the right to "(i) adjust the Fare for a particular
183
instance of Transportation Services ... ; or (ii) cancel the Fare for a particular instance of
Transportation Services .... Section 4.3 provides examples of instances where Uber may adjust
In addition, Section 4.3
a fare, one of which being "[the driver] took an inefficient route ....
"in the event of a User
as
such
a
fare,
cancel
may
Uber
where
provides examples of instances
complaint .... Id.
Id. at Section 12.2. Section 12.2 allows that "[e]ither party may terminate this
184
Agreement... without cause at any time upon seven (7) days prior written notice to the other
party .... Id.
See id. at Sections 4.1, 4.4, 12.1.
185
Id. at Section 4.1. Section 4.1 states that "[the driver] ... appoint[s] [Uber] as [the driver's]
186
limited payment collection agent." The link to employee status is stated in Section 13.1: "[e]xcept
as otherwise expressly provided herein with respect to [Uber] acting as the limited payment
collection agent .... the relationship between the parties under this Agreement is solely that of
independent contracting parties." Id.
See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992); SERVICES
187
AGREEMENT, supra note 65, at Section 4.4. Section 4.4 requires drivers "to pay [Uber] a service
This provision, in other words,
fee on a per Transportation Services transaction basis ....
provides that Uber does not receive revenue if its drivers to not transport riders. Id.
See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24; SERVICES AGREEMENT, supra note 65, at Section 12.1.
188
Section 12.1 of the Agreement states that "[t]his Agreement shall commence on the date accepted
by you and shall continue until terminated as set forth herein." Id.
181
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TNC for that matter) does not require any special skills.' 89 Drivers perform the
work that is the "regular business" of Uber: transporting riders for a fee. 190 And
the hiring party, Uber, is a business.'91
Provisions of the Services Agreement appear to lean toward independent
contractor status for Uber drivers. First, Uber denies in the Services Agreement
the ability to control its drivers while they transport riders. 192 Uber grants drivers
sole discretion in transporting riders. 193 Additionally, Uber details ways that it
refuses to dictate its drivers' performance. 94
Second, provisions in the Services Agreement indicate independent
contractor status according to the secondary factors in the common law test. 195
The Services Agreement requires drivers to provide their own work materials, 96
including their own vehicle, 197 although Uber will provide drivers with a mobile
device and data plan upon request provided that drivers reimburse Uber for these
expenses. 198 Drivers have no hour requirements or geographic restrictions,' 99 but
189
Cotter v. Lyft, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ("And driving for Lyft requires
no special skill-something we often expect independent contractors to have.").
190
See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24.

191

See id.

192

SERVICES AGREEMENT, supra note 65, at Sections 2.2, 2.4.
193
Id. at Section 2.2. Section 2.2 of the Agreement states "[the driver] shall be solely
responsible for determining the most effective, efficient and safe manner to perform each instance
of Transportation Services .... Id.
194
Id. at Section 2.4. Section 2.4 states that "[Uber] does not, and shall not be deemed to, direct
or control you generally or in your performance under this Agreement specifically ....
More
specifically, this section gives drivers the following powers:
[The driver] retain[s] the option ... to attempt to accept or to decline or ignore
a User's request for Transportation Services ... or to cancel an accepted

request for Transportation

Services ...

subject to [Uber's] then-current

cancellation policies. With the exception of any signage required by local law
or permit/license requirements, [Uber] shall have no right to require you to: (a)
display [Uber's] ... name[], logo[] or colors on your Vehicle(s); or (b) wear a
uniform or any other clothing displaying [Uber's] ... name[], logo[] or colors.
You... have complete discretion to provide services or otherwise engage in
other business or employment activities.
Id.
195

See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24.
196
SERVICES AGREEMENT, supra note 65, at Section 2.2. Section 2.2 of the Agreement states
that "[the driver] shall provide all necessary equipment, tools and other materials, at your own
expense .....
Id.
197

Id. at Section 3.2.

198
Id. at Section 2.6. Section 2.6 "encourages" drivers to use their own devices for Uber's
platform at their own expense. However, a driver can "elect to use any Company Devices," and
"[Uber] will supply [the driver] upon request with Company Devices and provide the necessary
wireless data plan" so long as the driver reimburses Uber for the associated costs. Id.
199
Id. at Section 2.4. Section 2.4 states that drivers have "the sole right to determine when,
where, and for how long you will utilize the Driver App or the Uber Services." Id.
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Uber will deactivate a driver's account if it is not activated once in a given
a regular wage 20 1
month. 200 Uber pays its drivers on a per-job basis as opposed to
20 2
and workers'
and requires drivers to maintain their own car insurance
20 3 In addition, Uber puts its drivers
applicable.
where
insurance,
compensation
on notice that it does not consider them employees; rather, Uber plainly states
20 4
that it considers its drivers independent contractors.
2. Classifying Uber's Drivers: An Attempt to Fit the Square Peg into
a Round Hole
Analyzing the findings in Part III.A. 1 yields no obvious answer. On its
face, the Services Agreement does not heavily support either employee or
independent contractor status; many provisions and factors cut in either
direction. In some respects, one could argue that Uber drivers have a high degree
of entrepreneurial opportunity. At the same time, Uber indeed controls its drivers
in some respects. Despite this difficulty, Yellow Taxi and Friendly, two cases
discussed in Part II.B.2.c involving worker classification of taxi cab drivers, are
useful in predicting how a court would answer whether Uber drivers are
employees or independent contractors.
On the one hand, Uber drivers resemble the taxi cab drivers in Yellow
Taxi. There, the taxi company, Suburban, could not dictate drivers' performance
20 5 However, Suburban did make
or require drivers to pick up passengers.
recommendations to its drivers in how to conduct themselves in different
206
Also, like Uber drivers, Suburban's drivers had no hours
situations.
requirement and picked up the majority of their passengers through Suburban's

Id. at Section 2.1. Section 2.1 of the Agreement states "[Uber] reserves the right to deactivate
your Driver ID if you have not fulfilled a request for Transportation Services using the Driver App
at least once a month." Id.
Id. at Section 4.1. Section 4.1 of the Agreement provides that a driver receives "a fare for
201
each instance of completed Transportation Services provided to a User ... "Id.
Id. at Section 8.1. Section 8.1 requires drivers to maintain "automobile liability insurance
202
that provides protection against bodily injury and property damage to third parties at levels ...that
satisfy the minimum requirements." Id.
203 Id. at Section 8.2. Section 8.2 requires drivers to maintain "workers' compensation
insurance as required by all applicable laws." Id.
Id. at Section 13.1. Section 13.1 states that
204
200

[T]he relationship between the parties under this Agreement is solely that of
independent contracting parties. The parties expressly agree that: (a) this
Agreement is not an employment agreement, nor does it create an employment
relationship, between [Uber] and [the driver]; and (b) no joint venture,
partnership, or agency relationship exists between [Uber] and [the driver].
Id.
205
206

Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 371-72 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Id. at 372.
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dispatch system.2 0 7 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that
Suburban did not control its drivers and that the drivers had entrepreneurial
opportunities. 208 Thus, thc
the court held that Suburban's drivers were independent
contractors. 20 9 The same result could be expected for Uber's drivers.
On the other hand, Uber drivers resemble the taxi cab drivers in Friendly.
In Friendly,the taxi company, Friendly, subjected drivers to a policy manual and
standard operating procedures that granted Friendly a degree of control over its
drivers. 210 Also, like Uber drivers, Friendly restricted its drivers' ability to
conduct independent business while driving for Friendly. 211 The Ninth Circuit
found that Friendly's drivers lacked the entrepreneurial opportunities one would
expect of independent contractors.2 12 Therefore, the court held that Friendly's
drivers were employees.2 13 Again, one could expect this outcome for Uber's
drivers.
Applying these conflicting cases to Uber drivers, the answer to the
worker classification question remains ambiguous.2 14 In some instances, Uber
drivers have a lot in common with Suburban's drivers. Uber denies control over
its drivers' performance, 215 and Uber drivers have discretion on which riders to
transport, have no hours requirement, and conduct their business through Uber's
platform.216 In other respects, Uber drivers appear to resemble Friendly's drivers.
Most notably, Uber subjects its drivers to control provisions in the Services
Agreement.2 17
This issue is further confounded when considered in light of FedEx
Home Delivery and Alexander. In those cases, two different courts came to
opposite conclusions when faced with the same type of FedEx drivers.2 18 While
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that FedEx

207
208
209

Id. at 369-70.
Id. at 384.
Id.

NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 2008).
211 Id. at 1094.
212
Id. at 1098.
213
Id. at 1103.
214
Uber drivers are also different from the taxi cab drivers in both Yellow Taxi and Friendly.
For example, Suburban's drivers kept all of their earned revenue. Yellow Taxi Co., 721 F.2d at 369.
And Friendly required its drivers to conform to a dress code and to service a particular geographic
area. FriendlyCab, 512 F.3d at 1094, 1103.
215
See SERVICES AGREEMENT, supra note 65, at Section 2.4.
216
Id. at Sections 2.4, 2.6.
217
Id. at Sections 2.3, 2.5, 4.3, 12.2.
218
See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Alexander v.
FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 2014).
210
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219
drivers had the entrepreneurial opportunities of independent contractors, the
Ninth Circuit found that FedEx exercised sufficient control over its drivers to
make them employees. 22° Thus, even when faced with a more traditional worker
relationship than that of TNC drivers, the courts cannot come to a unanimous
decision as to the classification of drivers. It is not a stretch of the imagination to
infer that the same could happen in different courts confronting the worker
classification of TNC drivers.
This uncertain outcome is unsatisfactory, and it is doubtlessly true that
any legal opinion would leave readers with no less questions than they had
before. As Judge Edward M. Chen stated in O'Connor,"many of the factors in
221
[the common law] test appear outmoded in this context., And, much is at stake
with this determination. Uber's viability, and thus its drivers' ability to work,
could be significantly affected.222 Part III.B will further this analysis by arguing
that policy renders the traditional worker classification dichotomy unfit in the
case of TNC drivers.

B. Policy Dictates That the Current Worker ClassificationLaw Is Unfit to
Describe TNC Drivers
Some fundamental issues are inherent with the current worker
classification test and dichotomy of employee-independent contractor. This is
especially true in the case of TNC drivers. As Judge Vince Chhabria lamented in
his conclusion to Cotter,
the jury in this case will be handed a square peg and asked to
choose between two round holes. The test the California courts
have developed over the 20th Century for classifying workers
isn't very helpful in addressing this 21 st Century problem. Some
factors point in one direction, some point in the other, and some
are ambiguous. Perhaps Lyft drivers who work more than a
certain number of hours should be employees while the others
should be independent contractors. Or perhaps Lyft drivers
should be considered a new category of worker altogether,
requiring a different set of protections. But absent legislative
intervention, California's outmoded test for classifying workers
will apply in cases like this. And, because the test provides

219
220

221
222

FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 504.
Alexander, 765 F.3d at 997.
O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
See text accompanying notes 68-74.
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nothing remotely close to a clear answer, it will often be for
juries to decide.22 3
The current test is a muddled collection of abstract yet fact-intensive
elements. As discussed in Part III.A above, even when applied to traditional
working relationships, it can produce unpredictable and conflicting results.22 4
Further, the employee-independent contractor dichotomy creates an all-ornothing outcome that often does a disservice to the working relationships it is
forced to describe.
These issues are compounded in the case of TNC drivers. Worker
classification law developed in a period where an analog to the relationship
between TNCs and their drivers did not exist. 225 TNC drivers not only create a
large deal of uncertainty under current worker classification law,226 they present
challenges that the current law is simply unequipped to address. A survey of Uber
drivers found that 87% drive for Uber to be their own boss, 85% enjoy the
flexibility Uber allows, and 73% prefer setting their own schedule as opposed to
having a nine-to-five job.227 Further, most Uber drivers were found to work low,
variable hours, and many simply drive for Uber to make extra spending
money. 228 These qualities are not indicative of a traditional employee or
independent contractor relationship.229 Yet, the current law mandates that this
decision be made.
Looking beyond how TNC drivers fit within existing worker
classification law, public opinion appears heavily in favor of the advent of the
sharing economy. Eighty-six percent of consumers familiar with the sharing
economy believe it to be more affordable, 83% believe it to be more efficient,
and 76% believe it to be better for the environment.230 Further, advocates claim
it creates a more efficient market, increases competition and transparency, and
reaches traditionally underserved consumers.2 3 1 This is not to say the sharing
Cotter v. Lyft Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081-82 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see also O'Connor,82
F. Supp. 3d at 1133, 1135 ("The application of the traditional test of employment-a test which
evolved under an economic model very different from the new 'sharing economy'-to Uber's
business model creates significant challenges.").
224
See, e.g., FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 495; Alexander, 765 F.3d at 981.
225
See O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1153; Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081-82.
226
See supra Part III.B.
227
Kate, supra note 61.
228
Id.
229
See O'Connor,82 F. Supp. 3d at 1153 ("Arguably, many of the factors in [the common law]
test appear outmoded in this context."); Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081-82 ("The test the California
courts have developed over the 20th Century for classifying workers isn't very helpful in
addressing this 21st Century problem. Some factors point in one direction, some point in the other,
and some are ambiguous.").
230
See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 14, at 9.
231
See THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 16, at 4-5.
223
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economy may not have any drawbacks. Critics raise concerns over unfair
competition and labor exploitation. In particular, critics argue that sharing
economy companies provide little to no protection for their users and retain the
bulk of the fee that is charged. 3
These are some of the reasons why the sharing economy deserves
tailored regulation. The sharing economy opens up avenues of wealth creation to
individuals who did not have such access before, and reduces costs charged to
consumers. At the same time, third parties could potentially siphon away the bulk
of the fee in sharing economy transactions. It is incumbent on lawmakers to
ensure this industry thrives while providing adequate protection to the people
involved.
Despite strong policy considerations, a decision under the current law
must be made. With this decision comes an all-or-nothing approach to whether
TNC drivers are employees or independent contractors. At one end, a finding of
employee status could greatly hinder the viability of TNC's business models. At
the other end, a finding of independent contractor status allows TNCs to take
advantage of labor that without which, TNCs would not exist. Both ends leave
major, justifiable policy arguments unfulfilled and probably create a legal
opinion that leaves most people scratching their heads. For this reason, Part III.C
will analyze solutions to this problem in the form of a third worker classification.
C. ProposedSolutions to the Worker Classificationof TNC Drivers
Parts III.A and III.B pointed out some of the problems with applying
worker classification law to TNC drivers. In short, the current law would not
produce a clear holding, and public policy should find that result unacceptable.
This section attempts to solve this problem by discussing potential legislative
solutions to the issue. Part III.C.1 will look at the dependent contractor
relationship, which already exists in some countries. Then, Part III.C.2 will argue
that lawmakers should enact a new, third classification that suits the sharing
economy and the new work relationships it creates.
1. Dependent Contractor
One proposal for solving the problem of worker classification in the
sharing economy is the creation of a dependent contractor classification.23 4
Canadian dependent contractors, a status between employee and independent
contractor on the classification scale,235 could serve as a model for lawmakers.
This third category was created to reflect realities evidenced by relationships
232

Baker, supra note 42; Reich, supra note 43.

233

Reich, supra note 43.

234

See Hagiu & Biederman, supra note 97; see also Weber, supra note 97.
McKee v. Reid's Heritage Homes Ltd., 2009 ONCA 916, para. 30 (Can. Ont.).

235
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similar to that of TNCs and their drivers-that contractors do not all depend
economically on their employers to the same degree.236
However, the dependent contractor relationship, as it appears in
countries like Canada, has its shortcomings when applied to TNC drivers. In
Canada, the difference between an employee and a contractor is determined by
analyzing the traditional common law right-to-control test factors similar to that
in the United States.237 Then, if contractor status is found, the difference between
an independent contractor and a dependent contractor hinges on "economic
dependency in the work relationship.2 38
One issue with the dependent contractor distinction in Canada is that it
may not even address the issues facing TNCs and their drivers. A court will not
consider the distinction between dependent and independent contractors unless
it finds the workers to be contractors under what is essentially the common law
right-to-control test. 239 While a third employment classification would
undoubtedly be helpful in assigning the varying rights of any set of workers,
under Canadian law, TNC drivers may never have the opportunity for this
consideration because the analysis may never be reached in the first place.
Another issue under this distinction is that some TNC drivers could be
dependent contractors while others could be independent contractors (assuming
the drivers are contractors at all). This is because not all TNC drivers are
economically dependent to the same degree on the TNC. 240 This would surely
create additional confusion and costs in litigating yet another hotly contested
distinction in worker classification.
2. A Worker Classification for the Sharing Economy and
Transportation Network Companies-the Platform Contractor
The sharing economy-and TNCs in particular-have put a strain on
traditional worker classification law. Additionally, possible alternatives, such as
a Canadian dependent contractor classification, are insufficient in fixing this
problem. The best solution is to craft a new worker classification that adequately
encompasses participants in the sharing economy and specifically TNC drivers.
The sharing economy can be described as "any marketplace that uses the
Internet to connect distributed networks of individuals to share or otherwise
exchange underutilized assets."24' Within the sharing economy are TNCs. TNCs
can be defined as companies that "provide prearranged transportation services

236

Id. at para. 25-36.

237

Id. at para. 38.

238

Id. at para. 22.
Id. at para. 34, 38.

239
240

241

See text accompanying notes 68-71.
See THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 16, at 4.
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for compensation using an online-enabled application or platform (such as smart
242
phone apps) to connect drivers using their personal vehicles with passengers.
Essentially, sharing economy companies and TNCs provide a platform that
allows individuals to easily exchange assets or skills. In return, the platform
deducts a portion of the fee charged between the individuals, which itself is
sometimes set by the platform.
The definition of sharing economy companies and TNCs should be the
starting point to a new statutory worker classification. Other factors should be
considered as well. As shown by Uber's drivers, people have different
motivations and participation rates when working in the sharing economy.2 43
Additionally, the degree to which TNCs and other companies exert control over
their drivers may vary. 244 And, of course, the new worker classification should
be accompanied with protections adequate to safeguard the workers who provide
the services essential to sharing economy companies.
With these factors in mind, this Note recommends that Congress and
state legislatures adopt a new, third worker classification for TNC drivers, and
similar sharing economy workers, called the "platform contractor." A platform
contractor should be defined as any worker who, through a third-party electronic
platform with the purpose of connecting platform contractors with consumers,
uses their own assets to provide a service for an individual. At a bare minimum,
the third party should owe the platform contractor minimum wage for the work
performed and liability insurance for actions performed in furtherance of the
parties' mutual business objectives. More protection may be deemed necessary
upon further inquiry, such as workers' compensation protection. In addition, the
amount of control exercised by the third party over the platform contractor
should not exceed what is required to maintain the good will of the individual
seeking use of the platform contractor's assets.
IV. CONCLUSION

Current worker classification law often feels more like an academic
exercise than a reliable standard which to apply. Its application often produces
contradictory results, 245 and can even produce the opposite result for the same
workers. 246 It should be no surprise that applying this standard to the new
working relationship between TNCs and their drivers proves confounding and

TransportationNetwork Companies,supra note 5.
See text accompanying notes 61-64.
244
Compare O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015), with Cotter
v. Lyft Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
245
See supra Part II.B.2.i.
See supra Part II.B.2.ii.
246
242

243
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unsatisfactory.24 7 Congress and state legislatures should act now to add a third
worker classification-ideally, the "platform contractor" classification proposed
in Part III.C.2-that suits the new working relationships created by the sharing
economy and TNCs.
Such a classification would encompass a growing number of workers
whose status would otherwise be unclear under the existing worker classification
law. The current law is unsuitable for these workers-it was developed in a time
when the reality of TNC workers did not exist.248 Judges who have attempted to
analyze the worker classification of TNC drivers have expressed their frustration
in "be[ing] handed a square peg and asked to choose between two round
holes., 249 If classified under the employee-independent contractor dichotomy,
the parties' rights and obligations would surely not reflect the reality of their
situation.
The sharing economy enables a new method of creating wealth for
individuals through the marketing of otherwise idle assets and skills.25 °
Organizations such as TNCs have emerged with platforms that connect these
individuals with others for the benefit of all involved.2 1 1 However, existing
worker classification law threatens the future of this business model. Therefore,
to suit the new working relationships created by the sharing economy, Congress
and state legislatures should enact a new, third worker classification targeted
toward this new industry.
Carl Shaffer*

247

See supra Part III.A.

248

See O'Connor,82 F. Supp. 3d at 1153; Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081-82.

249

Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081; see also O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1135.
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Koopman, supra note 1.

251

See UBER, supra note 3; LYFT, supra note 4.
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